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chapter 2
The Case for Behaviorally 
Informed Regulation
Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan, Eldar Shafir
Policymakers approach human behavior largely through the perspective of the 
“rational agent” model, which relies on normative, a priori analyses of the making 
of rational decisions. This perspective is promoted in the social sciences and in 
professional schools, and has come to dominate much of the formulation and 
conduct of policy. An alternative view, developed mostly through empirical 
behavioral research, provides a substantially different perspective on individual 
behavior and its policy implications. Behavior, according to the empirical per-
spective, is the outcome of perceptions, impulses, and other processes that char-
acterize the impressive machinery that we carry behind the eyes and between the 
ears. These proclivities, research has shown, intrude upon and shape behavior, 
often quite independently of deliberative intent, and in contrast with normative 
ideals that people endorse upon reflection. The results are systematic behaviors that 
are unforeseen and misunderstood by classical policy thinking. A more nuanced 
behavioral perspective, such research suggests, can yield deeper understanding 
and improved regulatory insight. 
For example, while the causes of the recent mortgage crisis are myriad, a 
central problem was that many borrowers took out loans that they did not 
understand and could not afford. Their behavior is inconsistent with a model 
of rational agents with perfect information and perfect foresight, and good reg-
ulation ought to take their rather common behavior into account. As discussed 
below, an opt-out home mortgage plan, such as one that provides a standard 
fixed-rate loan with straightforward terms, could be a start. A person could 
then choose to opt out in favor of another mortgage plan, but only after being 
shown comprehensible disclosures about the risks involved. Lenders will have 
an incentive to make such disclosures properly because they will bear greater 
liability or other costs in the case of default among those who have opted out. 
In what follows, we outline the main tenets of the behavioral perspective, 
we provide some examples of relevant policy applications, and we discuss the 
implications of this analysis for the conduct of policy, particularly in the context 
of a market economy.
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I. Human Behavior
In contrast with the rational agents of the classical theory, who make well 
informed, carefully considered, and fully controlled choices, behavioral research 
has shown that the availability of data does not always lead to effective commu-
nication and knowledge; understanding and intention do not necessarily lead to 
a desired action; and purportedly inconsequential contextual nuances can shape 
behavior and alter choices, often in ways that people themselves agree diminish 
their well-being in unintended ways.
I.1 Context
Human behavior turns out to be heavily context dependent, a function of both 
the person and the situation. One of the major lessons of modern psychological 
research is the impressive power that the situation exerts, along with a persistent 
tendency among people to underestimate that power relative to the presumed 
influence of intention, education, or personality traits. Various studies have 
documented the stunning capacity of situational factors to influence behaviors 
that are typically seen to reflect deep-seated personal predispositions. In his now-
classic obedience studies, for example, Milgram (1974) showed how decidedly 
mild situational pressures sufficed to generate persistent willingness on the part 
of regular people to administer what they believed to be grave levels of electric 
shock to innocent subjects. Along similar lines, Darley and Batson (1973) 
recruited seminary students to deliver a practice sermon on the parable of the 
Good Samaritan. While half the seminarians were told they had plenty of time, 
others were led to believe they were running late. On their way to give the talk, 
all participants passed an ostensibly injured man slumped and groaning in a 
doorway. Whereas the majority of those with time to spare stopped to help, 
a mere 10 percent of those who were running late stopped, the remaining 90 
percent stepping over the victim and rushing along. In contrast with these par-
ticipants’ ethical training and scholarship, the contextual nuance of a minor time 
constraint proved decisive in the decision not to stop and help a suffering man. 
As we analyze further below, the heavier-than-anticipated impact of context on 
behavior increases the importance and responsibility of effective regulation.
I.2 Decisional Conflict
On a less dramatic note, but of substantial policy relevance, are findings 
regarding the contextual impact of decisional conflict. People’s preferences are 
typically constructed, not merely revealed, during the decision-making process 
(Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006), and the construction of preferences can be heavily 
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influenced by the nature and the context of decision, which can have nontrivial 
regulatory implications, particularly as regards the proliferation of alternatives.
The classical view of decision making does not anticipate nor does it con-
sider the implications of decisional conflict. Each option according to this view 
is assigned a subjective value, or “utility,” and the person then proceeds to choose 
the option assigned the highest utility. A direct consequence of this account is 
that offering more alternatives is a good thing, since the more options there are, 
the more likely the consumer is to find one that proves attractive.
In contrast, since preferences tend to be constructed in the context of a 
decision, choices often prove difficult to make. People often search for a com-
pelling rationale for choosing one option over another, and whereas sometimes 
a compelling reason can be articulated, at other times no easy rationale presents 
itself, rendering the conflict between options hard to resolve. Such conflict can 
lead people to postpone the decision or to select a “default” option, and can gen-
erate preference patterns that are fundamentally different from those predicted 
by accounts based on value maximization. In particular, the addition of options 
can complicate (and, thus, “worsen”) the decision outcome while the normative 
assumption is that added options only make things better.
Decisional conflict, for example, has been shown to yield a greater tendency 
to search for alternatives when better options are available but the decision 
is difficult than when relatively inferior options are available and the decision is 
easy, even when expectations are otherwise the same (Tversky and Shafir 1992). 
More generally, as choices become difficult, consumers naturally tend to defer 
decisions, often indefinitely (Iyengar and Lepper 2000; Shafir, Simonson, and 
Tversky 1993; Tversky and Shafir 1992). In one study, expert physicians had to 
decide about medication for a patient with osteoarthritis. These physicians were 
more likely to decline prescribing a new medication when they had to choose 
between two new medications than when only one new medication was avail-
able (Redelmeier and Shafir 1995); the difficulty of choosing between the two 
medications presumably led some physicians to recommend not starting either 
one. A similar pattern was documented with shoppers in an upscale grocery 
store, where tasting booths offered the opportunity to taste six different jams in 
one condition, or any of twenty-four jams in the second. Of those who stopped 
to taste, 30 percent proceeded to purchase a jam from the six-jams selection, 
whereas only 3 percent purchased a jam from the twenty-four–jam selection 
(Iyengar and Lepper 2000).
Bertrand, Karlan, Mullainathan, Shafir, and Zinman (2008) conducted a field 
experiment with a local lender in South Africa to assess the relative importance 
of various subtle psychological manipulations in the decision to take up a loan 
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offer. Clients were sent letters offering large short-term loans at randomly 
assigned interest rates. In addition, several psychological features on the offer 
letter were also independently randomized, one of which was the number of 
sample loans shown: the offer letters displayed either one example of a loan size 
and term, along with respective monthly repayments, or it displayed four such 
examples. In contrast with standard economic prediction and in line with conflict-
based predictions, higher take-up was observed under the one-example descrip-
tion than under the multiple-example version. The magnitude of this effect was 
large: the simple (one-example) description of the offer had the same positive 
effect on take-up as dropping the monthly interest on these loans by more than 
two percentage points. In a related finding, Iyengar, Jiang, and Huberman (2004) 
show that employees’ participation in 401(k) plans drops as the number of fund 
options proposed by their employer increases.
Adherence to the default or status quo has also been observed in naturally 
occurring “experiments.” One concerning insurance decisions occurred when 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania both introduced the option of a limited right to 
sue, entitling automobile drivers to lower insurance rates. The two states dif-
fered in their default option: New Jersey motorists needed to acquire the full right 
to sue (transaction costs were minimal: a signature), whereas in Pennsylvania, 
the full right to sue was the default, which could then be forfeited in favor of 
the limited alternative. Whereas only about 20 percent of New Jersey drivers 
chose to acquire the full right to sue, approximately 75 percent of Pennsylvania 
drivers chose to retain it ( Johnson et al 1993). A second naturally occurring 
“experiment” was recently observed in Europeans’ decisions about being potential 
organ donors ( Johnson and Goldstein 2003). In some European nations drivers 
are, by default, organ donors unless they elect not to be, whereas in other European 
nations they are, by default, not donors unless they choose to be. Observed rates 
of organ donors are almost 98 percent in the former nations and about 15 percent 
in the latter—a remarkable difference, given the low transaction costs and the 
significance of the decision.
These and other studies show that minor contextual changes can alter what 
consumers choose in ways that are unlikely to relate to their ultimate utility. It 
suggests that a proliferation of alternatives, which is where consumer markets 
are typically headed, needs to be addressed and handled with care, rather than 
be seen as an obvious advantage. It also suggests that the determination of a 
default outcome, for example, rather than being conceived as a mere formality 
that can be effortlessly circumvented, needs to be chosen thoughtfully, since it 
acquires a privileged status. In effect, when multiple options or the status quo are 
inappropriately handled (intentionally or not) this can decrease social welfare.
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I.3 Mental Accounting 
In their intuitive mental accounting schemes, people compartmentalize wealth 
and spending into distinct budget categories, such as savings, rent, and enter-
tainment, and into separate mental accounts, such as current income, assets, and 
future income (Thaler 1985; 1992). Contrary to standard assumptions of fungi-
bility, people exhibit different degrees of willingness to spend from their various 
accounts, which yields consumption patterns that are overly dependent on current 
income and sensitive to labels so that, for example, people save and borrow 
(often at a higher interest rate) at the same time (Ausubel 1991).
An understanding of such proclivities may help design instruments that 
bring about more desirable outcomes. For example, given that people are sus-
ceptible to faulty planning, distraction, and procrastination, studies have shown 
that saving works best as a default. Participation in 401(k) plans is significantly 
higher when employers offer automatic enrollment (Madrian and Shea 2001), 
and because participants tend to retain the default contribution rates, savings 
can be increased if they agree to increased default deductions following future 
raises (Benartzi and Thaler 2004).
I.4 Construal
A simple but fundamental tension between classical economic analyses and 
modern behavioral research is captured by the role of psychological “construal.” 
Agents in classical economic analyses are presumed to choose among objective 
options in the world. People, however, do not typically contemplate objective 
circumstances; rather, stimuli are mentally construed, interpreted, represented, 
and then acted upon. Behavior is directed not toward actual states of the world, 
but toward our mental representation of those states, and mental representa-
tions do not bear a one-to-one relationship to the thing they represent, nor 
do they necessarily constitute faithful renditions of actual circumstances. As a 
result, many well-intentioned policy interventions can fail, or succeed, because 
of the way in which they are construed by the targeted group. For example, 
people who are rewarded for a behavior they find interesting and enjoyable can 
come to attribute their interest in the behavior to the reward and, consequently, 
come to view the behavior as less attractive (Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett 1973). 
In one classic study, for example, children who were offered a “good player 
award” to play with magic markers—which they had previously done with great 
relish in the absence of extrinsic rewards—subsequently showed little interest 
in the markers when these were introduced as an unawarded classroom activity 
(in contrast with children who had not received an award and showed no 
decrease in interest.) Similarly, decisions can be changed when preceded by a 
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related act that leads to differential construal of one’s preferences. Several “foot-
in-the-door” and “lowball” techniques are based on the premise that initial 
compliance with a small request leads people to be then more likely to comply 
with a larger one. In this vein, Freedman and Fraser (1966) have shown that 
subjects are more likely to put up a large Drive Carefully sign on their lawn 
if they have already complied with a request to put up a smaller one or to sign a 
petition regarding careful driving, even when the requests were made by differ-
ent people. Similarly, Cialdini, Cacioppo, Bassett, and Miller’s (1978) subjects 
were more likely to go pick up United Way posters if they had initially agreed 
to display them, as compared to a group that had not first considered the more 
modest request.
Other behavioral factors can influence the outcomes of decisions in ways 
that standard analysis is likely to miss; however, a full summary is beyond our 
present purview. To list just a few, people often are not very good at predicting 
their future tastes or at learning from past experience (Kahneman 1994), and 
their choices can be influenced by anticipated regret (Bell 1982), by costs 
already incurred (Arkes and Blumer 1985; Gourville and Soman 1998), by overly 
optimistic planning (Buehler, Griffin, and Ross 1994) and by the effects of 
temporal separation, where high discount rates for future as compared to present 
outcomes can yield dynamically inconsistent preferences (Loewenstein and 
Elster 1992; Loewenstein and Thaler 1992). Contrary to standard assumptions, 
the psychological carriers of value are gains and losses, rather than anticipated 
final states of wealth, and attitudes toward risk tend to shift from risk aversion 
in the face of gains to risk seeking for losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
Also, people are loss averse (the loss associated with giving up a good is sub-
stantially greater than the utility associated with obtaining it (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1991). This, in turn, leads to a general reluctance to depart from 
the status quo, because what needs to be renounced is valued more highly than 
the anticipated benefits (Knetsch 1989; Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988).
I.5 Knowledge and Attention
Standard theory assumes that consumers are attentive and knowledgeable, and 
typically able to avail themselves of important information. In contrast, there 
appears to be a rampant ignorance of options, program rules, benefits, and 
opportunities, and not only among the poor or the uneducated. Surveys show that 
fewer than one-fifth of investors (in stocks, bonds, funds, or other securities) 
can be considered “financially literate” (Alexander, Jones, and Nigro 1998), and 
similar findings describe the understanding shown by participants in pension 
plans—meaning, mostly, 401(k)s (Schultz 1995). Indeed, even older beneficiaries 
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often do not know what kind of pension they are set to receive, or what mix of 
stocks and bonds they are invested in.
The amount of information people attend to is limited, and cognitive load 
has been shown to affect performance in everyday tasks. To the extent that con-
sumers find themselves in challenging situations that are unfamiliar, distracting, 
or tense, all of which consume cognitive resources, fewer resources will be avail-
able to process the information that is relevant to the decision at hand. This, in 
turn, can make decision making even more dependent on situational cues and 
immaterial considerations. Furthermore, this is likely to be even more true for 
“low literate” participants, whose even more limited knowledge and understanding 
can lead them to experience difficulties with effort-versus-accuracy tradeoffs, to 
rely excessively on peripheral cues in product advertising and packaging, and 
even to withdraw systematically from market interactions (Adkins and Ozanne 
2005, and references therein.) In summary, for participants with limited cog-
nitive resources, whose decisions are heavily dependent on perceived norms, 
automatic defaults, and other minor contextual nuances, regulation merits even 
greater attention.
I.6 Context and Institutions
The substantial influence of context on behavior naturally implies that institu-
tions will come to play a central role in shaping how people think and what they 
do. Among other things:
Institutions Shape Defaults
Institutions normally define defaults. Moreover, it is well established that defaults 
can have a profound influence on the outcomes of individual choices. Data 
available on decisions ranging from retirement savings and portfolio choices to 
the decision to be a willing organ donor illustrate the substantial increase in 
market share of default options ( Johnson and Goldstein 2003; Johnson et al 
1993). Although the default in an abstract sense appears to be merely one among 
a number of alternatives, in reality defaults benefit not only from confusion, 
procrastination, forgetting, and other sources of inaction, but they may also 
be perceived as the most popular option (this often becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophesy), or the option implicitly recommended.
Institutions Shape Behavior
Many low-income families are, in fact, savers, whether or not they resort to 
banks (Berry 2004). Without the help of a financial institution, however, their 
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savings are at risk (including theft, impulse spending, and the needs of house-
hold members), savings will grow more slowly, and may not be readily available 
to support access to reasonably priced credit in times of need. Institutions 
provide safety and control. In circumstances of momentary need, temptation, 
distraction, or limited self-control, those savers who are unbanked are likely 
to find it all the more difficult to succeed on the path to long-term prosperity. 
A recent survey conducted by the American Payroll Association shows that 
“American employees are gaining confidence in direct deposit as a reliable 
method of payment that gives them greater control over their finances, and that 
employers are recognizing direct deposit as a low-cost employee benefit that can 
also save payroll processing time and money.”1 The employers of the poor, in 
contrast, often neither require nor propose electronic salary payments. Instead, 
they prefer not to offer direct deposit to hourly, nonexempt employees, tem-
porary or seasonal employees, part-timers, union employees, and employees in 
remote locations—all categories that correlate with being low paid. The most 
frequently stated reasons for not offering direct deposit to these employees 
include lack of processing time to meet standard industry (“Automatic Clearing 
House”) requirements, high turnover, and union contract restrictions. All this 
creates a missed opportunity to offer favorable defaults to needy individuals, 
whose de facto default consists of going after hours to cash their check for 
a hefty fee.
Institutions Provide Implicit Planning
As it turns out, a variety of institutions provide implicit planning, often in ways 
that address potential behavioral weaknesses. Credit card companies send cus-
tomers timely reminders of due payments, and clients can elect to have their 
utility bills automatically charged, allowing them to avoid late fees if occasion-
ally they do not get around to paying in time. The low-income buyer, on the 
other hand, without the credit card, the automatic billing, or the Web-based 
reminders, risks missed payments, late fees, disconnected utilities (followed by 
high reconnection charges), etc. Interestingly, context can also be detrimental 
by providing debt too easily. Temporal discounting in general and present bias 
in particular can be exploited to make cash now more attractive than future 
costs appear menacing.
A behavioral analysis yields new appreciation for the impact and responsi-
bility of financial institutions, which should be considered not merely from a 
financial cost-saving point of view, but, instead, should be understood to affect 
people’s lives, by easing their planning, facilitating their intended actions, or 
enabling their resistance to temptation.
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II. Interaction with Markets
The perspective outlined above, and the regulation it triggers, need to be 
embedded in the logic of markets. A framework is required that takes into 
account firm incentives and responses to behaviorally motivated regulation. This 
perspective produces two dimensions to consider. First, the psychological biases 
of individuals can either help or hurt the firms they interact with; hence firms’ 
and public-minded regulators’ interests are sometimes misaligned and some-
times not. Consider a consumer who does not understand the profound effects 
of the compounding of interest. Such a bias would lead the individual both to 
undersave, and to overborrow. Society would prefer that the individual did 
not have such a bias in both contexts. Firms, however, would prefer that the 
individual not have the bias to undersave, so that funds intended for investment 
and fee generation would not diminish (abstracting from fee structures), but, at 
least over the short term, firms would be perfectly content to see the same indi-
vidual overborrow (abstracting from collection costs). Because people are fallible 
and easily misled, transparency does not always pay off and firms sometimes 
have strong incentives to exacerbate psychological biases by hiding borrowing 
costs. Regulation in this case faces a much more difficult challenge than in 
the savings situation. The market response to individual failure can profoundly 
affect regulation. In attempting to boost participation in 401(k) retirement 
plans, the regulator faces at worst indifferent and at best positively inclined 
employers seeking to boost employee retention and to comply with federal 
pension rules.2 In forcing disclosure of hidden prices of credit, by contrast, the 
regulator often faces noncooperative firms, whose interests are to find ways to 
work around or undo interventions.
A second implication of our equilibrium model of firms in particular markets 
interacting with individuals with specific psychologies is that the mode of 
regulation chosen should take account of this interaction. We might think of 
the regulator as holding two different levers, which we describe as changing 
the rules and changing the scoring.3 When forcing disclosure of the APR, for 
example, the regulator effectively changes the “rules” of the game: what a firm 
must say. A stronger form of rule change is product regulation: changing what 
a firm must do. Behavioral rule changes, such as creating a favored starting 
position or default, falls between these two types. When changing liability or 
providing tax incentives, by contrast, the regulator changes the way the game is 
“scored.” Typically, changing the rules of the game (without changing the scor-
ing, as through liability changes) maintains the firms’ original incentives to help 
or hurt consumer bias, channeling the incentive into different behaviors by firms 
or individuals, while changing the scoring of the game can alter those incentives.
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This perspective highlights the care that must be taken when transferring, 
for example, the insights of defaults in 401(k) participation to other domains. 
According to the present analysis, changing the rules on retirement saving (by 
introducing defaults) works well because employers’ incentives align (or do not 
misalign) with regulatory efforts to guide individual choice. In other words, 
under current conditions, employers are either unaffected or may even be hurt 
by individuals’ propensity to undersave in 401(k) plans.4 They thus will not 
oppose an attempt to fix that problem. In other applications, where firms’ 
incentives misalign with regulatory intent, changing the rules alone may not 
work well since firms may have the ability to work creatively around those rule 
changes. Interestingly, such circumstances may lead to regulations (“changing 
the scoring”) which, though deeply motivated by behavioral insights, are not 
themselves particularly psychological in nature. That is, given market responses, 
psychological rules such as defaults or framing may be too weak, and changes 
in liability rules or other measures may be necessary, as we explain below.
This distinction in market responses to individual psychology is central to 
our framework and is illustrated in table 1. In some cases, the market is either 
neutral or wants to overcome consumer fallibility. In other cases, the market 
would like to exploit or exaggerate consumer fallibility. Thus, when consumers 
misunderstand compounding of interest in the context of saving, banks have 
incentives to reduce this misunderstanding so that they can increase their depos-
its. When consumers misunderstand compounding in the context of borrowing, 
lenders have little incentive to remove this misunderstanding, as it can only 
Table 1. The Firm and the Individual
Behavioral 
Fallibility
Market neutral and/or wants to 
overcome consumer fallibility





Consumers misunderstand  
compounding in savings
• Banks would like to reduce this 
to increase savings base
Consumers misunderstand 
compounding in borrowing
• Banks would like to exploit 
this to increase borrowing
Consumers 
procrastinate
Consumers procrastinate in  
signing up for EITC
• Tax filing companies would like 
to reduce this so as to increase 
number of customers
Consumers procrastinate in 
returning rebates
• Retailers would like to exploit 
this to increase revenues
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decrease the debts they are able to issue.5 When consumers procrastinate in 
signing up for the EITC (and hence in filing for taxes) private tax preparation 
firms have incentives to discourage such procrastination so as to increase their 
customer base. When consumers procrastinate in returning rebates (but make 
retail purchases as if they are going to get a rebate), retailers benefit. Note the 
parallelism in these examples: firm incentives to alleviate or exploit a bias are 
not an intrinsic feature of the bias itself. Instead, they are a function of how the 
bias plays itself out in the particular market structure.
In the consumer credit market, we worry that many interactions between 
individuals and firms are of the kind in which firms seek to exploit rather than 
alleviate bias. If true, this raises the concern of overextrapolating from the 
401(k) defaults example to credit products. To the extent that 401(k) defaults 
work because optimal behavior is largely aligned with market incentives, other 
areas, such as credit markets, might be more difficult to regulate with mere 
defaults. Furthermore, if the credit market is dominated by “low-road” firms 
offering opaque products that “prey” on human weakness, it is more likely that 
regulators of such a market will be captured because “high-road” interests are 
too weak to push back against low-road players; that market forces will defeat 
positive defaults sets; and that low-road players will continue to dominate. 
Many observers, for example, believe that the credit card markets are, in fact, 
currently dominated by such low-road firms (see, for example, Mann 2007; 
Bar-Gill 2004) and that formerly high-road players have come to adopt the sharp 
practices of their low-road competitors. If government policymakers want to 
attempt to use defaults in such contexts, they might need to deploy “stickier” 
defaults or more aggressive policy options.
In our approach to the issue of regulatory choice the regulator can either 
change the rules of the game or change the scoring of the game. Setting a 
default is an example of changing the rules of the game, as is disclosure regula-
tion. Specifically, the rules of the game are changed when there is an attempt to 
change the nature of the interactions between individuals and firms, as when 
the regulation attempts to affect what can be said, offered, or done. Changing 
the scoring of the game, by contrast, changes the payoffs a firm will receive for 
particular outcomes. This may be done without a particular rule about how the 
outcome is to be achieved. For example, pension regulation that penalizes firms 
whose 401(k) plan enrollment is top-heavy with highly paid executives is an 
example of how scoring gives firms incentives to enroll low-income individuals 
without setting particular rules on how this is done. Changing rules and changing 
scoring often accompany each other, but they are conceptually distinct.
The discussion below illustrates how policies in the top right corner of table 
2 face a particular challenge. Changing the rules of the game alone will be 
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difficult when firms are highly motivated to find workarounds. As such, when 
we suggest opt-out policies in mortgages below, the challenge will be to find 
ways to make these starting positions “sticky” so that firms do not simply undo 
their default nature. In our judgment, both achieving a good default and figur-
ing out how to make it work requires separating low-road from high-road firms 
and making it profitable for high-road firms to offer the default product 
(for a related concept, see Kennedy 2005). For that to work, the default must be 
sufficiently attractive to consumers, sufficiently profitable for high-road firms to 
succeed in offering it, and penalties associated with deviations from the default 
must be sufficiently costly so as to make the default “stick” even in the face of 
market pressures from low-road firms. It may be that in some credit markets, 
low-road firms have become so dominant that sticky defaults will be ineffectual. 
Moreover, achieving such a default is likely more costly than making defaults 
work when market incentives align, not least because the costs associated with 
the stickiness of the default involve greater deadweight losses given that there 
will be higher costs to opt out for those for whom deviating from the default 
is optimal. These losses would need to be weighed against the losses from the 
current system, as well as against losses from alternative approaches, such as 
disclosure or product regulation. Nonetheless, given the considerations above, 
it seems worth exploring whether such sticky defaults can help to transform 
consumer financial markets. 
Table 2. Behaviorally Informed Regulation
Market neutral and/or wants to 
overcome consumer fallibility
Market exploits  
consumer fallibility
Rules Public education on saving
Direct deposit/auto-save
Licensing
Sticky defaults (opt-out  
mortgage or credit card)
Information de-biasing on debt  
(full information disclosure,  
payoff time for credit cards)
Scoring Tax incentives for  
savings vehicles
IRS Direct Deposit Accounts
Ex post liability standard for  
truth in lending
Broker fiduciary duty and/or  
changing compensation  
(Yield Spread Premiums)
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The lessons of a more nuanced behavioral perspective are twofold. On the 
one hand, people’s behavior is idiosyncratic, context dependent, and nuanced 
in ways that render simple normative assumptions misleading and, in general, 
complicate policy design. On the other hand, because behavior follows its own 
rules, policymakers have an added responsibility to concern themselves with 
appropriate context and detail, and a reason to hope that attention will lead to 
improved outcomes.
As noted above, because of likely market responses to psychological factors 
in different contexts, regulation may need to take a variety of forms, including 
some that while informed by psychology are not designed to affect behavioral 
change, but rather to alter the structure of the market in which relevant choices 
are made. In what follows, we consider behaviorally informed regulation in the 
context of mortgage, credit card, and banking markets, with specific proposals 
that fall into each bin. Given the complexities involved, our purpose is not to 
champion the specific policies below. Rather, we illustrate how a behaviorally 
informed regulatory analysis may lead to a deeper understanding of the costs 
and benefits, and to potentially improved designs, of specific policies.
III. Behaviorally Informed Policies 
III.1 Behaviorally Informed Home Mortgage Regulation
Full Information Disclosure to De-bias Borrowers
With the advent of nationwide credit reporting systems and the refinement of 
credit scoring and modeling, creditors and brokers themselves, including not 
just their credit scores, but their likely performance regarding a particular set of 
loan products. Creditors will know whether borrowers could qualify for better, 
cheaper loans, as well as how likely it is that borrowers will meet their obliga-
tions under an existing mortgage, or become delinquent, refinance, default, 
or go into foreclosure. Yet lenders are not required to reveal this information 
to borrowers. At the same time, the lack of disclosure of such information is 
likely exacerbated by consumer beliefs. Consumers likely have false background 
assumptions regarding what brokers and creditors reveal to them about their 
borrowing status. What if consumers believe the following?
Creditors reveal all information about me and the loan products I am qualified 
to receive. Brokers work for me in finding me the best loan for my purposes, and 
lenders offer me the best loans for which I qualify. I must be qualified for the loan 
I have been offered, or the lender would not have validated the choice by offering 
me the loan. Because I am qualified for the loan that must mean that the lender 
thinks that I can repay the loan. Why else would they lend me the money? Moreover, 
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the government tightly regulates home mortgages; they make the lender give me all 
these legal forms. Surely the government must regulate all aspects of this transaction.
In reality, the government does not regulate as borrowers believe, and lenders 
do not necessarily behave as borrowers hope. Instead, information is hidden 
from borrowers, information that would improve market competition and out-
comes. Given consumers’ probably false background assumptions and the reality 
of asymmetric information favoring lenders and brokers, we suggest that creditors 
be required to reveal useful information to borrowers at the time of a mortgage 
loan offer, including disclosure of borrowers’ credit scores, and borrowers’ quali-
fications for all of lenders’ mortgage products. Brokers could even be required 
to reveal the wholesale rate sheet pricing—the rates at which lenders would be 
willing to lend to each type of borrower. Such an approach corresponds to the 
use of de-biasing information, in the top right of table 2.
The goal of these disclosures would be to put pressure on creditors and bro-
kers to be honest in their dealings with applicants. The additional information 
might improve comparison shopping and perhaps outcomes. Of course, revealing 
such information would also reduce broker and creditor profit margins. But if 
the classic market competition story relies on full information, and assumes 
rational behavior based on understanding, we can view this proposal as simply 
attempting to remove market frictions from information failures, and move the 
market competition model more toward its ideal. By reducing information 
asymmetry, full information disclosure would help to de-bias consumers and 
lead to better competitive outcomes.
Ex Post Standards-based Truth in Lending
Optimal disclosure will not simply occur in all markets through competition 
alone. Competition under a range of plausible scenarios will not necessarily 
generate psychologically informative and actionable disclosure, as the current 
crisis in the subprime mortgage sector suggests may have occurred. If competi-
tion does not produce informative disclosure, disclosure regulation might be 
necessary. But simply because disclosure regulation is needed does not mean it 
will work. Regulating disclosure appropriately is difficult and requires substantial 
sophistication by regulators, including psychological insight.
A behavioral perspective could focus on improving disclosures themselves. 
The goal of disclosure should be to improve the quality of information about 
contract terms in meaningful ways. That would suggest, for example, that simply 
adding information is unlikely to work. Disclosure policies are effective to the 
extent that they present a frame—a way of perceiving the disclosure—that is 
both well understood and conveys salient information that helps the decision 
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maker act optimally. It is possible, for example, that information about the failure 
frequency of particular products might help (for example, Two out of ten bor-
rowers who take this kind of loan default), but proper framing can be difficult to 
achieve and to maintain consistently, given that it may vary across situations. 
Moreover, the attempt to improve decision quality through an improvement in 
consumers’ understanding, which is presumed to change consumers’ intentions 
to act, and finally their actual actions, is fraught with difficulty. There is often a 
gap between understanding and intention, and particularly between intention 
and action.
Furthermore, even if meaningful disclosure rules can be created, sellers can 
undermine whatever before-the-fact or ex ante disclosure rule is established, 
in some contexts simply by “complying” with it: Here’s the disclosure form I’m 
supposed to give you, just sign here. For example, with rules-based ex ante disclo-
sure requirements for credit, such as the Truth in Lending Act of 1968 (TILA), 
the rule is set up first, and the firm (the discloser) moves last. While an ex ante 
rule provides certainty to creditors, whatever gave the discloser incentives to 
confuse consumers remains in the face of the regulation. While disclosers may 
officially comply with a given rule, they will nonetheless remain susceptible to 
market pressure to find other means to avoid the salutary effects on consumer 
decisions that the disclosure is intended to achieve.
In light of the difficulties of addressing such issues ex ante, we propose that 
policymakers consider shifting away from sole reliance on a rules-based, ex ante 
regulatory structure for disclosure embodied in TILA and toward integration 
of an ex post, standards-based disclosure requirement as well. Rather than a 
rule, we would deploy a standard, and rather than an ex ante decision about 
content, we would permit the standard to be enforced after loans are made. 
In essence, courts or expert agencies would determine whether the disclosure 
would, under common understanding, have effectively communicated the key 
terms of the mortgage to the typical borrower. This approach could be similar 
to ex post determinations of reasonableness of disclaimers of warranties in sales 
contracts under UCC 2-316 (see White and Summers 1995). This type of policy 
intervention would correspond to a change in “scoring,” in the lower right of 
table 2.
In our judgment, an ex post version of truth in lending based on a reason-
able-person standard to complement the fixed disclosure rule under TILA 
might permit innovation—both in products themselves and in strategies of 
disclosure—while minimizing rule evasion. An ex post standard with sufficient 
teeth could change the incentives of firms to confuse and would be more 
difficult to evade. Under the current approach, creditors can easily “evade” TILA, 
by simultaneously complying with its actual terms and making the required 
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disclosures regarding the terms effectively useless in the context of the borrowing 
decisions of consumers with limited attention and understanding. TILA, for 
example, does not block a creditor from introducing a more salient term (Lower 
monthly cost!) to compete with the APR for borrowers’ attention. Under an ex 
post standards approach, by contrast, lenders could not plead compliance with 
TILA as a defense. Rather, the question would be one of objective reasonable-
ness: whether the lender meaningfully conveyed the information required for 
a typical consumer to make a reasonable judgment about the loan. Standards 
would also lower the cost of specification ex ante. Clarity of contract is hard 
to specify ex ante but easier to verify ex post. Over time, through agency action, 
guidance, model disclosures, “no action” letters, and court decisions, the param-
eters of the reasonableness standard would become known and predictable.
While TILA has significant shortcomings, we do not propose abandoning 
it. Rather, TILA would remain (with whatever useful modifications to it might 
be gleaned from our increased understanding of consumers’ emotions, thought 
processes, and behaviors). Quite recently, for example, the Federal Reserve Board 
unveiled major and useful changes to its disclosure rules, based in part on 
consumer research.6 TILA would still be important in permitting comparison-
shopping among mortgage products, one of its two central goals. However, 
some of the burden of TILA’s second goal, to induce firms to reveal information 
that would promote better consumer understanding, would be shifted to the ex 
post standard.
Of course, there would be significant costs to such an approach, especially 
at first. Litigation or regulatory enforcement would impose direct costs and 
the uncertainty surrounding enforcement of the standard ex post might deter 
innovation in the development of mortgage products. The additional costs of 
compliance with a disclosure standard might reduce lenders’ willingness to 
develop new mortgage products designed to reach lower-income or minority 
borrowers who might not be served by the firms’ plain-vanilla products. The 
lack of clear rules might also increase consumer confusion regarding how to 
compare innovative mortgage products to each other, even while it increases 
consumer understanding of the particular mortgage products being offered. 
Even if we couple the advantages of TILA for mortgage comparisons with the 
advantages of an ex post standard for disclosure in promoting clarity, the net 
result may simply be greater confusion with respect to cross-loan comparisons. 
That is, if consumer confusion results mostly from firm obfuscation, then 
our proposal will likely help a good deal. By contrast, if consumer confusion in 
this context results mostly from market complexity in product innovation, then 
the proposal is unlikely to make a major difference, and other approaches 
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focused on loan comparisons might be warranted (see, for example, Thaler and 
Sunstein 2008).
Despite the shortcomings of an ex post standard for truth in lending, we 
believe that such an approach is worth pursuing. To limit the costs associated 
with our approach, the ex post determination of reasonableness could be signif-
icantly confined. For example, if courts are to be involved in enforcement, the 
ex post standard for reasonableness of disclosure might be limited to providing 
a (partial) defense to payment in foreclosure or bankruptcy, rather than being 
open to broader enforcement through affirmative suit. Alternatively, rather than 
court enforcement, the ex post standard might be enforced by the bank regula-
tors or another expert consumer agency,7 through supervision and enforcement 
actions. The ex post exposure might be significantly reduced through ex ante 
steps. For example, regulators might develop safe harbors for reasonable disclo-
sures, issue model disclosures, use “no action” letters to provide certainty to 
lenders, and the like. Moreover, firms might be tasked with conducting regular 
surveys of borrowers or conducting experimental design research to validate 
their disclosures, with positive results from the research providing rebuttable 
presumptions of reasonableness, or even safe harbors from challenge. The key is 
to give the standard sufficient teeth without deterring innovation. The precise 
contours of enforcement and liability are not essential to the concept, and 
weighing the costs and benefits of such penalties is beyond the scope of what 
we hope to do in introducing the idea here. Further work will be required to 
detail the design for implementation.
“Sticky” Opt-Out Mortgage Regulation
While the causes of the mortgage crisis are myriad, a central problem was that 
many borrowers took out loans that they did not understand and could not 
afford. Brokers and lenders offered loans that looked much less expensive than 
they really were, because of low initial monthly payments and costly hidden 
features. Families commonly make mistakes in taking out home mortgages 
because they are misled by broker sales tactics, misunderstand the complicated 
terms and financial tradeoffs in mortgages, wrongly forecast their own behavior 
and misperceive their risks of borrowing. How many homeowners really under-
stand how the teaser rate, introductory rate, and reset rate relate to the London 
interbank offered rate plus some specified margin, or can judge whether the 
prepayment penalty will offset the gains from the teaser rate?
Improved disclosures might help. Altering the rules of the game of disclosure, 
and altering the “scoring” for seeking to evade proper disclosure, may be suffi-
cient to reduce the worst outcomes. However, if market pressures and consumer 
confusion are sufficiently strong, such disclosure may not be enough. If market 
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complexity is sufficiently disruptive to consumer choice, product regulation 
might prove most appropriate. For example, by barring prepayment penalties, 
we could reduce lock-in to bad mortgages; by barring short-term ARMs and 
balloon payments, we could reduce refinance pressure; in both cases, more of the 
cost of the loan would be pushed into interest rates and competition could focus 
on a consistently stated price in the form of the APR. Price competition would 
benefit consumers, who would be more likely to understand the terms on which 
lenders were competing. Product regulation would also reduce cognitive and 
emotional pressures related to potentially bad decision making by reducing the 
number of choices and eliminating loan features that put pressure on borrowers 
to refinance on bad terms. However, product regulation may stifle beneficial 
innovation and there is always the possibility that government may simply get 
it wrong.
For that reason, we propose a new form of regulation. We propose that a 
default be established with increased liability exposure for deviations that harm 
consumers. For lack of a better term, we call this a sticky opt-out mortgage sys-
tem. As with opt-out regulation generally, a sticky opt-out system would fall, 
in terms of stringency, somewhere between product regulation and disclosure; 
however, for reasons we explain below, market forces would likely swamp a pure 
opt-out regime—that’s where the need for stickiness comes in. This approach 
corresponds to a combination of changing the rules of the game, in the top 
right of table 2, and changing liability rules, at the bottom right of that table.
The proposal is grounded in our equilibrium model of firm incentives and 
individual psychology. Borrowers may be unable to distinguish among complex 
loan products and act optimally based on such an understanding (see, for exam-
ple, Ausubel 1991). We thus deploy an opt-out strategy to make it easier for 
borrowers to choose a standard product, and harder for borrowers to choose a 
product that they are less likely to understand. At the same time, lenders may 
seek to extract surplus from borrowers because of asymmetric information 
about future income or default probabilities (see Musto 2007), and, in the short 
term, lenders and brokers may benefit from selling borrowers loans they cannot 
afford. Thus, a pure default would be undermined by firms, and regulation needs 
to take account of this market pressure by pushing back.
In our model, lenders would be required to offer eligible borrowers a standard 
mortgage (or set of mortgages), such as a fixed-rate, self-amortizing thirty-year 
mortgage loan, according to reasonable underwriting standards. The precise 
contours of the standard set of mortgages would be set by regulation. Lenders 
would be free to charge whatever interest rate they wanted on the loan, and, 
subject to the constraints outlined below, could offer whatever other loan prod-
ucts they wanted outside of the standard package. Borrowers, however, would 
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get the standard mortgage offered, unless they chose to opt out in favor of a 
nonstandard option offered by the lender, after honest and comprehensible dis-
closures from brokers or lenders about the terms and risks of the alternative 
mortgages. An opt-out mortgage system would mean that borrowers would be 
more likely to get straightforward loans they could understand.
But for the reasons cited above, a plain-vanilla opt-out policy is likely to be 
inadequate. Unlike the savings context, where market incentives align well with 
policies to overcome behavioral biases, in the context of credit markets, firms 
often have an incentive to hide the true costs of borrowing. Given the strong 
market pressures to deviate from the default offer, we would need to require 
more than a simple opt-out to make the default sticky enough to make a differ-
ence in outcomes. Deviation from the offer would require heightened disclosures 
and additional legal exposure for lenders in order to make the default sticky. 
Under our plan, lenders would have stronger incentives to provide meaningful 
disclosures to those whom they convince to opt out, because they would face 
increased regulatory scrutiny, or increased costs if the loans did not work out. 
Future work will need to explore in greater detail the enforcement mecha-
nism. For example, under one potential approach to making the opt-out sticky, 
if default occurs when a borrower opts out, the borrower could raise the lack of 
reasonable disclosure as a defense to bankruptcy or foreclosure. Using an objec-
tive reasonableness standard akin to that used for warranty analysis under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, if the court determined that the disclosure would 
not effectively communicate the key terms and risks of the mortgage to the 
typical borrower, the court could modify or rescind the loan contract.8 Another 
alternative would be to have the banking agencies (or another expert consumer 
agency) enforce the requirement on a supervisory basis, rather than relying 
on the courts. The agency would be responsible for supervising the nature of 
disclosures according to a reasonableness standard, and would impose a fine on 
the lender and order corrective actions if the disclosures were found to be 
unreasonable. The precise nature of the stickiness required and the tradeoffs 
involved in imposing these costs on lenders would need to be explored in greater 
detail, but in principle, a sticky opt-out policy could effectively leverage the 
behavioral insight that defaults matter with the industrial-organizational insight 
that certain market incentives work against a pure opt-out policy.
An opt-out mortgage system with stickiness might provide several benefits 
over current market outcomes. Under the plan, a plain-vanilla set of default mort-
gages would be easier to compare across mortgage offers. Information would be 
more efficiently transmitted across the market. Consumers would be likely to 
understand the key terms and features of such standard products better than 
they would alternative mortgage products. Price competition would more likely 
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become salient once features are standardized. In behavioral terms, when alter-
native products are introduced, consumers would be made aware that such 
alternatives represent deviations from the default, helping to anchor consumers 
in the terms of the default product and providing some basic expectations for 
what ought to enter into their choices. Framing the mortgage choice as one 
between accepting a standard mortgage offer and needing affirmatively to choose 
a nonstandard product should improve consumer decision making. Creditors 
will be required to make heightened disclosures about the risks of the alternative 
loan products for the borrower, subject to legal sanction in the event of failure 
to reasonably disclose such risks; the legal sanctions should deter creditors from 
making highly unreasonable alternative offers with hidden and complicated 
terms. Consumers may be less likely to make significant mistakes. In contrast 
to a pure product regulation approach, the sticky default approach would allow 
lenders to continue to develop new kinds of mortgages, but only when they can 
adequately explain key terms and risks to borrowers.
Moreover, requiring a default to be offered, accompanied by required height-
ened disclosures and increased legal exposure for deviations, may help to make 
high-road lending more profitable than low-road lending—at least if deviations 
resulting in harm are appropriately penalized. If offering an opt-out mortgage 
product helps to split the market between high- and low-road firms, and rewards 
the former, the market may shift (back) toward firms that offer home mortgage 
products that better serve borrowers. For this to work effectively, the default—
and the efforts to make the default sticky—would need to enable the consumer 
easily to distinguish the typical “good” loan, benefiting both lender and bor-
rower, and which would be offered as the default, from a wide range of “bad” 
loans: for example, those that benefit the lender with higher rates and fees 
but harm the borrower; those that benefit the borrower but harm the lender; 
and those that harm the borrower and lender but benefit third parties, such 
as brokers.
There will be costs associated with requiring an opt-out home mortgage. 
For example, the sticky defaults may not be sticky enough to alter outcomes, 
given market pressures. The default could be undermined, as well, through the 
firm’s incentive structures for loan officers and brokers, which could provide 
greater rewards for nonstandard loans. Implementation of the measure may be 
costly and the disclosure requirement and uncertainty regarding enforcement of 
the standard might reduce overall access to home mortgage lending. There may 
be too many cases in which alternative products are optimal, so that the default 
product is in essence “incorrect,” and comes to be seen as such. The default would 
then matter less over time, and forcing firms and consumers to go through the 
process of deviating from it would become increasingly just another burden 
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(like existing disclosure paperwork) along the road to getting a home mortgage 
loan. Low-income, minority, or first-time homeowners who have benefited from 
more flexible underwriting and more innovative mortgage developments might 
see their access reduced if the standard set of mortgages does not include prod-
ucts suitable to their needs.
We could improve these outcomes in a variety of ways. For example, the 
opt-out regulation could require that the standard set of mortgages include a 
thirty-year fixed mortgage, a five- or seven-year adjustable-rate mortgage, and 
straightforward mortgages designed to meet the particular needs of first-time, 
minority, or low-income homeowners. We might develop “smart defaults,” based 
on key borrower characteristics, such as income and age. With a handful of key 
facts, an optimal default might be offered to an individual borrower. The optimal 
default would consist of a mortgage or set of mortgages that most closely align 
with the set of mortgages that the typical borrower with that income, age, and 
education would prefer. For example, a borrower with rising income prospects 
might appropriately be offered a five-year adjustable-rate mortgage. Smart 
defaults might reduce error costs associated with the proposal and increase the 
range of mortgages that can be developed to meet the needs of a broad range of 
borrowers, including lower-income or first-time homeowners; however, smart 
defaults may add to consumer confusion. Even if the consumer (with the par-
ticular characteristics encompassed by the smart default) only faces one default 
product, spillover from too many options across the market may make decision 
making more difficult. Moreover, it may be difficult to design smart defaults 
consistent with fair lending rules.
Another approach to improve the standard mortgage choice set and to reduce 
enforcement costs over time would be to build in banking agency supervision 
as well as periodic required reviews of the defaults, with consumer experimental 
design or survey research to test both the products and the disclosures, so that 
the disclosures and the default products stay current with updated knowledge 
of outcomes in the home mortgage market. Indeed, lenders might be required 
to conduct such research and to disclose the results to regulators and the public 
upon developing a new product and its related disclosures. In addition, regula-
tors might use the results of the research to provide safe harbors for disclosures 
that are shown to be reasonable ex ante through these methods. Regulators 
could also issue “no-action” letters regarding disclosures that are deemed to be 
reasonable through such research. The appropriate federal and state supervisory 
agencies could be required to conduct ongoing supervision and testing of com-
pliance with the opt-out regulations and disclosure requirements. The federal 
and state banking agencies could easily adapt to this additional role with respect 
to depositories, while the FTC, a new expert consumer finance agency, or state 
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agencies would need to be provided with the authority and resources to conduct 
ongoing supervisory and testing functions for nondepositories, instead of relying 
solely on enforcement actions. Through these no-action letters, safe harbors, 
supervision, and other regulatory guidance, the regulators can develop a body of 
law that would increase compliance across the diverse financial sectors involved 
in mortgage lending, while reducing the uncertainty facing lenders from the new 
opt-out requirement, and providing greater freedom for financial innovation.
Restructure the Relationship Between Brokers and Borrowers
An alternative approach to addressing the problem of market incentives to 
exploit behavioral biases would be to focus directly on restructuring brokers’ duties 
to borrowers and reforming compensation schemes that provide incentives to 
brokers to mislead borrowers. Mortgage brokers have dominated the subprime 
market. Brokers generally have been compensated with “yield spread premiums” 
(YSPs) for getting borrowers to pay higher rates than those for which the 
borrower would qualify. Such YSPs have been used widely.9 In loans with yield 
spread premiums, unlike other loans, there is wide dispersion in prices paid to 
mortgage brokers. As Howell Jackson has shown, within the group of borrowers 
paying yield spread premiums, African Americans paid $474 more for their 
loans, and Hispanics $590 more, than white borrowers; thus, even if minority 
and white borrowers could qualify for the same rate, in practice minority bor-
rowers are likely to pay much more.10 
Brokers cannot be monitored sufficiently by borrowers (see Jackson and 
Burlingame 2007), and it is dubious that additional disclosures would help bor-
rowers be better monitors (see, for example FTC 2007), in part because brokers’ 
disclosures of potential conflicts of interest may paradoxically increase consumer 
trust (Cain et al 2005). Thus, if the broker is required to tell the borrower that 
the broker works for himself, not in the interest of the borrower, the borrower’s 
trust in the broker may increase—after all, the broker is being honest! Moreover, 
evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis suggests that while in theory 
creditors and investors have some incentives to monitor brokers, they do not do 
so effectively.
It is possible to undertake an array of structural changes regarding the broker-
borrower relationship. For example, we could alter the incentives of creditors 
and investors to monitor mortgage brokers by changing liability rules to make 
it clear that broker misconduct can be attributed to lenders and creditors in 
suits by borrowers (see Engel and McCoy 2007). We could directly regulate 
mortgage brokers through licensing and registration requirements (as is done 
elsewhere; for example, in the U.K.); recent U.S. legislation now mandates 
licensing and reporting requirements for brokers. In addition, the ex post 
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disclosure standard we suggest might have a salutary effect by making it more 
costly for lenders when brokers evade disclosure duties; this may lead to better 
monitoring of brokers.
We also believe it is worth considering fundamentally altering the duties of 
brokers by treating mortgage brokers as fiduciaries to borrowers, and subjecting 
them to requirements similar to those that govern investment advisors under 
the Investment Advisors Act. This would, of course, require vast changes to the 
brokerage market, including to the ways in which mortgage brokers are com-
pensated, and by whom. We would need to shift from a lender-compensation 
system to a borrower-compensation system, and we would need a regulatory 
system and resources to police the fiduciary duty. An interim step with much 
lower costs, and potentially significant benefits, would be to ban yield spread 
premiums. Banning YSPs could reduce some broker abuses by eliminating a 
strong incentive for brokers to seek out higher-cost loans for customers. In fact, 
quite recently a number of lenders have moved away from YSPs to fixed fees 
with some funds held back until the loan has performed well for a period of 
time, precisely because of broker conflicts of interest in seeking higher YSPs 
rather than sound loans. Banning YSPs now would reinforce these high-road 
practices and protect against a renewed and profitable low-road push for using 
YSPs to increase market share once stability is restored to mortgage markets. 
Banning YSPs would constitute a form of scoring change, corresponding to 
regulation in the bottom right of table 2, because it affects the payoff brokers 
receive for pursuing different mortgage outcomes.
III.2 Behaviorally Informed Credit Card Regulation
Using Framing and Salience in Disclosures  
to Encourage Good Credit Card Behavior
Credit card companies have fine-tuned product offerings and disclosures in a 
manner that appears to be systematically designed to prey on common psycho-
logical biases—biases that limit consumer ability to make rational choices 
regarding credit card borrowing.11 Behavioral economics suggests that consumers 
underestimate how much they will borrow and overestimate their ability to pay 
their bills in a timely manner.12 Credit card companies can then price their 
credit cards and compete on the basis of these fundamental human failings.13 
Nearly 60 percent of credit card holders do not pay their bills in full every 
month (Bucks et al 2006). Moreover, excessive credit card debt can lead to 
personal financial ruin. Credit card debt is a good predictor of bankruptcy.14 
Ronald Mann has argued that credit card companies seek to keep consumers 
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in a “sweat box” of distressed credit card debt, paying high fees for as long as 
possible before finally succumbing to bankruptcy.15 
The 2005 bankruptcy legislation16 focused on the need for improved bor-
rower responsibility but paid insufficient attention to creditor responsibility for 
borrowing patterns. Credit card companies provide complex disclosures regarding 
teaser rates, introductory terms, variable rate cards, penalties, and a host of other 
matters. Both the terms themselves and the disclosures are confusing to con-
sumers.17 Credit card companies are not competing, it appears, to offer the most 
transparent pricing.
Going forward, regulatory and legislative steps could help prod the credit 
card industry into better practices. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
intervened to require national banks to engage in better credit card practices 
and to provide greater transparency on minimum payments,18 and the Federal 
Reserve recently released proposed changes to its regulations under TILA, in 
part in the wake of TILA amendments contained in the bankruptcy legisla-
tion.19 Under the proposals, for example, creditors would need to disclose that 
paying only the minimum balance would lengthen the payoff time and interest 
paid on the credit card; describe a hypothetical example of a payoff period 
paying only the minimum balance; and provide a toll-free number for the con-
sumer to obtain an estimate of actual payoff time.20 Although the very length 
and complexity of the board’s proposal hints at the difficulty of the task of using 
complex disclosure to alter consumer understanding and behavior, such improved 
disclosures might nevertheless help.
But we could do much better. Congress could require that minimum pay-
ment terms be accompanied by clear statements regarding how long it would 
take, and how much interest would be paid, if the customer’s actual balance 
were paid off only in minimum payments, and card companies could be required 
to state the monthly payment amount that would be required to pay the cus-
tomer’s actual balance in full over some reasonable period of time, as deter-
mined by regulation. These tailored disclosures use framing and salience to help 
consumers, whose intuitions regarding compounding and timing are weak, to 
make better-informed payment choices based on their specific circumstances. 
Such an approach would correspond to changing the rules in order to de-bias 
consumers with behaviorally informed information disclosure, in the top right 
of table 2. Although credit card companies have opposed such ideas in the past, 
disclosures based on the customer’s actual balances are not overly burdensome.
Disclosures regarding the expected time to pay off actual credit card 
balances are designed to provide a salient frame intended to facilitate more 
optimal behavior. But such disclosures may not be strong enough to matter. The 
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disclosures are geared toward influencing borrowers’ intention to alter their 
behavior; however, even if the disclosure succeeds in shaping intention, we know 
that there is often a large gap between intention and action (Buehler et al 2002; 
Koehler and Poon 2005). In fact, borrowers would need to change behavior in 
the face of strong inertia and marketing by credit card companies propelling them 
to make no more than minimum payments. More generally, once such disclo-
sure requirement were enacted, market players opposed to them would promptly 
attempt to undermine them with countervailing marketing and other policies.
An Opt-Out Payment Plan for Credit Cards
A more promising approach, geared more directly toward shaping behavior 
rather than influencing intentions, would be to develop an “opt-out payment 
plan” for credit cards, under which consumers would be required automatically 
to make the payment necessary to pay off their existing balance over a relatively 
short period of time unless the customer affirmatively opted out of such a pay-
ment plan and chose an alterative payment plan with a longer (or shorter) 
payment term.21 Such an approach corresponds to changing the rules through 
opt-out policies, as in the top right of table 2. Given what we know about 
default rules and framing, such a payment plan may be followed by many con-
sumers. The payment plan would create expectations about consumer conduct 
and in any event inertia would cause many households simply to follow the 
plan. Increasing such behavior would mean lower rates of interest and fees paid, 
and lower incidence of financial failure. In any event, confronting an optimal 
payment plan may force cardholders to confront the reality of their borrowing, 
and this may help to alter their borrowing behavior, or their payoff plans. 
Moreover, credit card industry players would find it difficult to argue publicly 
against reasonable opt-out payment plans and, in the face of such plans, to con-
tinue using a pricing model based on borrowers going into financial distress.
Of course, an opt-out payment plan will impose costs. Some consumers 
who, in the absence of the opt-out payment plan, would have paid off their 
credit cards much faster than the plan provides, might now follow the slower 
payment plan offered as the default, thus incurring higher costs from interest and 
fees, and possibly even facing a higher chance of financial failure. Alternatively, 
some consumers might follow the opt-out payment plan when it is unaffordable 
for them, consequently reducing necessary current consumption such as medical 
care or sufficient food, or incurring other costly forms of debt. While there are 
undoubtedly problems with such an approach, public debate over the proposal 
would at least have the virtue of engaging all relevant players in an important 
conversation about fundamental changes in market practice.
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Regulate Late Fees
A narrower intervention based on behavioral insights about credit card customers 
would seek to change the behavior of credit card firms rather than consumers. 
One problem with the pricing of credit cards is that credit card firms can charge 
late and overlimit fees with relative impunity because consumers typically do 
not believe ex ante that they will pay such fees. In principle, firms need to charge 
late and overlimit fees to the extent that they wish to provide incentives to cus-
tomers not to pay late or go over their credit card limits. In practice, given the 
fees they charge, credit card firms are perfectly content to let consumers pay 
late and go over their card limits, in order to obtain fee revenue from them.
We would change the scoring of the game (corresponding to a regulatory 
choice in the bottom right of table 2). Under our proposal, firms could deter 
consumers from paying late or going over their credit card limits with whatever 
fees they deemed appropriate, but the bulk of such fees would be placed in a 
public trust to be used for financial education and assistance to troubled bor-
rowers. Firms would retain a fixed percentage of the fees to pay for their actual 
costs incurred from late payments or overlimit charges, or for any increased 
risks of default that such behavior presages. The benefit of such an approach is 
that it permits firms to deter “bad conduct” by consumers, but prevents firms 
from taking advantage of the psychological insight that consumers predictably 
misforecast their own behavior with respect to paying late and borrowing over 
their limit. Firm incentives to overcharge for late payments and overlimit bor-
rowing would be removed, while firms would retain incentives appropriately to 
deter these consumer failures.
As with our other proposals, there would be costs as well: in particular, the 
reduced revenue stream to lenders from these fees would mean that other rates 
and fees would be adjusted to compensate, and there is little reason to believe 
that the adjustments would be in consumers’ favor. Moreover, taxing late and 
overlimit fees in this manner might be seen as a significant interference with 
contractual relationships beyond the form and content of disclosures required 
under TILA for credit card agreements.
Opt-Out Credit Card
As a last option to consider in the credit card market, we might think about 
a regulation requiring firms to offer a standard opt-out credit card. Elizabeth 
Warren (2007) has argued that private sector firms should offer “clean” credit 
cards with straightforward terms and honest pricing. We agree with her that 
this would be a significant achievement and would set an important example 
for others. Looking at the structure of the market, we might wonder whether 
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such a high-road firm offering a clean credit card could win market share and 
remain profitable. Given predictable consumer biases, such firms will have a hard 
time competing with low-road players offering less transparent and seemingly 
“better” offers. We thus wonder whether regulation might be designed to 
reward high-road credit card firms while penalizing low-road firms offering 
products designed to take advantage of consumer failings.
Warren’s innovative suggestion in this regard is for the creation of a con-
sumer financial safety commission that could review credit card offers.22  Perhaps 
an entity such as this could specify terms and conditions that are “safe” and 
qualify for being offered as a standard credit card. As with the home mortgage 
idea discussed earlier, consumers would be offered credit cards that meet the 
definition of “safe.” They could opt for another kind of credit card, but only 
after meaningful disclosure. And credit card firms would face increased liability 
risk if the disclosure were found to have been unreasonable. As with our earlier 
concept, the precise details of liability determination and consequences would 
need to be carefully calibrated. In essence, the proposal would permit firms to 
continue to innovate in credit card practices, but with strong pressure to adopt 
straightforward practices and with the risk of increased consequences to firms 
when consumers opt out and wind up in trouble. This type of sticky opt-out 
provision, as with our proposal for an opt-out home mortgage, would corre-
spond to changing both the rules and the scoring of the game on the right side 
of table 2. 
III.3 Increasing Saving Among LMI Households
Savings is an area ripe for further behavioral attention. So far, much of behavior-
ally informed saving policy has focused on using defaults to improve retirement 
saving. For many low- and moderate-income households, however, there is a 
much greater need to focus on basic banking services and short-term savings 
options, services which, for this population, may require a different mix of gov-
ernmental responses than those envisioned in the context of retirement savings 
for middle- and upper-income households.
Many low- and moderate-income (LMI) individuals lack access to the sort 
of financial services that middle-income families take for granted, such as 
checking accounts or easily utilized savings opportunities. High-cost financial 
services, barriers to savings, lack of insurance, and credit constraints increase 
the economic challenges faced by LMI families. In the short run, it is often 
hard for these families to deal with fluctuations in income that occur because 
of job changes, instability in hours worked, medical illnesses or emergencies, 
changes in family composition, or myriad other factors that can cause abrupt 
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changes in economic inflows and outflows. At low income levels, small income 
fluctuations may create serious problems in paying rent, utilities, or other bills. 
Moreover, the high costs and low utility of the financial transaction services 
used by many low-income households extract a daily toll on take-home pay. 
Limited access to mainstream financial services reduces ready opportunities to 
save and thus limit families’ ability to build assets and to save for the future.
In theory, opt-out policies ought to work well here, as in the retirement 
world, in encouraging saving by such households. However, while in general 
the market pulls in the same direction as policy for saving, market forces 
weaken or break down entirely with respect to encouraging saving for low-
income households. This is simply because the administrative costs of collecting 
small-value deposits are high in relation to banks’ potential earnings on the 
relatively small amounts saved, unless the bank can charge high fees; with suf-
ficiently high fees, however, it is not clear that having a bank account makes 
economic sense for LMI households. Indeed, the current structure of bank 
accounts is one of the primary reasons why LMI households do not have them.
With respect to transaction accounts, high minimum-balance requirements, 
high fees for overdraft protection or bounced checks, and delays in check clear-
ance dissuade LMI households from opening or retaining bank accounts. 
Moreover, banks use the private ChexSystems to screen out households who 
have had difficulty with accounts in the past. Behaviorally insightful tweaks are 
unlikely to suffice in this context; rather, we need to devise methods to change 
the nature of the products being offered and, with them, the behavior of the 
consumers who open and maintain the accounts.
In this area, we need to figure out how to increase scale and offset costs for 
the private sector, in addition to increasing saving by low- and moderate-income 
families. As explained more fully below, we propose two options: a new tax credit 
to financial institutions for offering safe and affordable bank accounts, and a 
proposal under which the IRS would direct deposit tax refunds into “opt-out” 
bank accounts automatically set up through private sector financial institutions 
at tax time. Both proposals are designed to induce the private sector to change 
their account offerings by offering tax subsidies or government bundling to 
reach scale, as well as to alter consumer behavior through the structure of the 
accounts offered. The proposals pertain to changing the rules and the scoring 
on the left hand side of table 2, where markets may prove neutral to, or even 
positively inclined toward, the potential overcoming of consumer fallibility. In 
particular, the tax credit and government backing change the scoring to firms 
for offering such products, while the opt-out nature of the proposal changes the 
starting rules.
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Tax Credit to Financial Institutions for  
Offering Safe and Affordable Bank Accounts
To overcome the problem of the high fixed costs of offering sensible transaction 
accounts to low-income individuals with low savings levels, Congress could 
enact a pay-for-performance tax credit for financial institutions that offer safe 
and affordable bank accounts to LMI households (see Barr 2004, 2007). With 
such a tax credit, financial institutions would be entitled to claim tax credits 
for a fixed amount per account opened by LMI households. The bank accounts 
eligible for the tax credit could be structured and priced by the private sector, 
but according to essential terms required by regulation. For example, costly and 
inefficient checking accounts with high risk of overdraft or costly hidden 
features would be eschewed in favor of low-cost, low-risk accounts with only 
debit-card access. In particular, bank accounts would be debit-card based, with no 
check-writing capability, no overdrafts permitted, and no ChexSystems rejections 
for past account failures, in the absence of fraud or other meaningful abuse.
The power of the tax credit initiative could be significantly increased if it 
were coupled with a series of behaviorally informed efforts to improve take-up 
of the accounts and savings outcomes for account holders. For example, banks 
could reach out to employers to encourage direct deposit and automatic savings 
plans to set up default rules that would increase savings outcomes. With an 
automatic savings plan, accounts could be structured so that holders could des-
ignate a portion of their paycheck to be deposited into a savings “pocket”; the 
savings feature would rely on the precommitment device of automatic savings, 
and funds would be somewhat more difficult to access than those in the regular 
bank account, in order to make the commitment more likely to stick. To provide 
necessary access to emergency funds in a more cost effective manner than 
usually available to LMI households, the bank account could also include a six-
month consumer loan with direct deposit and direct debit, using relationship 
banking and automated payment systems to provide an alternative to costly pay-
day loans. With direct deposit of income and direct debit of interest and prin-
cipal due, the loan should be relatively costless to service and relatively low-risk 
for the bank. With a longer payment period than usual for payday lending, the 
loan should be more manageable for consumers living paycheck to paycheck, 
and would likely lead to less repeated borrowing undertaken to stay current on 
past payday loans. Moreover, the loan repayment features could also include a 
provision that consumers “pay themselves first,” by including a savings deposit 
to their account with every payment. Such a precommitment device could over-
come the tendency to procrastinate in savings and reduce the likelihood of 
needing future emergency borrowing. All these efforts could increase take-up 
of the banking product and lead to improved savings outcomes.
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An Opt-Out Bank Account for Tax Refunds
Congress could also enact a new, opt-out “tax refund account” plan to encourage 
savings and expanded access to banking services, while reducing reliance on 
costly refund loans (see Barr 2007). Under the plan, unbanked low-income 
households who file their tax returns would have their tax refunds directly 
deposited into a new account. Banks agreeing to offer safe and affordable bank 
accounts would register with the IRS to offer the accounts, and a fiscal agent 
for the IRS would draw from a roster of banks offering these services in the 
taxpayer’s geographic area in assigning the new accounts. On receiving the 
account number from its fiscal agent, the IRS would directly deposit EITC 
(and other tax refunds) into those accounts. Taxpayers could choose to opt out 
of the system if they did not want to directly deposit their refund, but we would 
expect the accounts to be widely accepted since they would significantly reduce 
the costs for taxpayers of receiving their tax refunds. Once the tax refund 
account is set up through the IRS mechanism at tax time, households would 
receive their tax refund in the account, weeks earlier than if they had to wait for 
a paper check. Moreover, once it is established, the account could continue to 
be used long past tax time. Households could also use the account just like any 
other bank account—to receive their income, to save, to pay bills, and the like.
By using an opt-out strategy and reaching households at tax time, this 
approach could help to overcome consumer biases to procrastinate in setting 
up accounts. By reducing the time it takes to receive a refund, setting up such 
accounts could help to reduce the incentives to take out costly refund loans, incen-
tives that are magnified by temporal myopia and widespread misunderstanding 
of the costs of credit. This system could dramatically, efficiently, and quickly 
reach millions of LMI households and bring them into the banking system. A 
complementary approach (Koide 2007) would reach sufficient scale by using 
prepaid debit cards and pooled accounts offered by a single vendor chosen by 
the IRS, rather than individual bank accounts offered by a large number of 
financial institutions. In this manner, the private sector vendor would be assured 
a large scale of operations. In either event, opt-out strategies and government 
incentives would be coupled to reach low-income households with essential 
banking services.
IV. Concluding Remarks
We propose a different approach to regulation. Whereas the classical perspective 
assumes that people generally know what is important and knowable, plan with 
insight and patience, and carry out their plans with wisdom and self-control, 
the central gist of the behavioral perspective is that people often fail to know 
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and understand things that matter; that they misperceive, misallocate, and fail 
to carry out their intended plans; and that the context in which people function 
has great impact on their behavior, and, consequently, merits careful attention 
and constructive work. In our framework, successful regulation requires integrat-
ing this richer view of human behavior with our understanding of markets. Firms 
will operate on the contour defined by this psychology and will respond strate-
gically to regulations. As we describe above, because firms have a great deal of 
latitude in issue framing, product design, and so on, they have the capacity to 
affect behavior and circumvent or pervert regulatory constraints. Ironically, firms’ 
capacity to do so is enhanced by their interaction with “behavioral” consumers 
(as opposed to the hypothetically rational actors of neoclassical economic theory), 
since so many of the things a regulator would find very hard to control (for exam-
ple, frames, design, complexity, etc.) can greatly influence consumers’ behavior. 
The challenge of behaviorally informed regulation, therefore, is to be well designed 
and insightful both about human behavior and about the behaviors that firms 
are likely to exhibit in response to both consumer behavior and regulation.
With that in mind, we have outlined ten ideas: (1) full information disclo-
sure to de-bias home mortgage borrowers; (2) a new standard for truth in lending; 
(3) a “sticky” opt-out home mortgage system; (4) restructuring the relationship 
between brokers and borrowers; (5) using framing and salience to improve credit 
card disclosures; (6) an opt-out payment plan for credit cards; (7) an opt-out credit 
card; (8) regulating of credit card late fees; (9) a tax credit for banks offering safe 
and affordable accounts; and (10) an opt-out bank account for tax refunds. These 
examples, we hope, will serve to encourage more behaviorally informed regula-
tion in years to come.
Notes
1 For more details, see: http://legacy.americanpayroll.org/pdfs/paycard/DDsurv_
results0212.pdf.
2 We recognize that there are significant compliance issues regarding pensions and 
retirement plans, disclosure failures, fee churning and complicated and costly fee 
structures, conflicts of interest in plan management, as well as problems with encour-
aging employers to sign up low-wage workers for retirement plans. We do not mean 
to suggest that these failings are trivial—far from it. We only mean to suggest that, 
as a comparative matter, market incentives to overcome psychological biases in order to 
encourage saving are more aligned with optimal social policy than market incentives 
to exacerbate psychological biases that encourage borrowing.
3 We use this bimodal framework of regulatory choice to simplify the exploration of 
how our model of individual psychology and firm incentives affects regulation. We 
acknowledge that the regulatory choice matrix is more complex (see Barr 2005).
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4 This is largely because of the existing regulatory framework: pension regulation gives 
employers incentives to enroll lower-income individuals in 401(k) programs. Absent 
this, it is likely that firms would be happy to discourage enrollment since they often 
must pay the match for these individuals. This point is interesting because it suggests 
that even defaults in savings only work because some other regulation “changed the 
scoring” of the game.
5 This example abstracts from collection costs (which would reduce firms’ incentives to 
hide borrowing costs) and instead focuses on the short-term behavior generally exhib-
ited by firms, as in the recent home mortgage crisis.
6 See Federal Reserve Board, Final Rule Amending Regulation Z, 12 CFR part 226 
( July 14, 2008); Summary of Findings: Consumer Testing of Mortgage Broker 
Disclosures, submitted to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, July 
10, 2008; Federal Reserve Board, Proposed Rule Amending Regulation Z, 12 CFR 
part 226 ( June 14, 2007), Federal Register 72, no. 114: 32948; Design and Testing of 
Effective Truth in Lending Disclosures, Submitted to the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, May 16, 2007.
7 Elizabeth Warren, for example, has proposed a new Financial Product Safety Com-
mission. See Warren 2007.
8 A more aggressive approach would be to permit class-action litigation on an affirmative 
basis. In this paper, we are not yet able to balance the costs of class-action litigation 
against the benefits of stronger enforcement.
9 See Jackson and Burlingame 2007, p. 127. While in principle yield-spread premiums 
could permit lenders legitimately to pass on the cost of a mortgage broker fee to a 
cash-strapped borrower in the form of a higher interest rate rather than in the form 
of a cash payment, the evidence suggests that yield-spread premiums are in fact used 
to compensate brokers for getting borrowers to accept higher interest rates, prepay-
ment penalties, and other loan terms.
10 Ibid.: 125; see also Guttentag 2000.
11 See generally Bar-Gill 2004: 1373.
12 Ibid.: 1395–96.
13 Ibid.: 1394–95.
14 Mann 2006: 60–69.
15 Mann 2007: 375.
16 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub L. no. 
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq [2005]). 
17 See, for example U.S. General Accounting Office, “Credit Cards: Increased Complexity 
in Rates and Fees Heightens the Need for More Effective Disclosures to Consumers,” 
Report 06-929, 2006.
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18 See, for example, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Bull. 2003-1, 
“Credit Card Lending: Account Management and Loss Allowance Guidance” (2003); 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Advisory Letter 2004-4, “Secured 
Credit Cards” (2004), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2004-4.doc; 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Advisory Letter 2004-10, “Credit Card 
Practices” (2004), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2004-10.doc.
19 See press release, Federal Reserve Board, Proposed Amendments to Regulation Z, 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Press/bcreg/2007/20070523/
default.htm (May 23, 2007). 
20 Federal Reserve Board, Proposed Rule, 12 C.F.R. 226, proposed §.7(b)(12), imple-
menting 15 U.S.C. §1637(b)(11).
21 Barr (2007). For a related proposal, see Gordon and Douglas 2005 (arguing for an 
opt-out direct-debit arrangement for credit cards.
22 Ibid.
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